As the exclusive bargaining representative of more than 16,000 air traffic controllers and engineers within the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association is a system user expert on modernization of the aviation system. NATCA believes it is critical to have a stable, guaranteed funding stream, in order to implement the best, and most cost effective, equipment in both centers and tower control facilities.

NATCA has long believed that adequate and sustained funding is essential to the modernization of the national air system (NAS) and we have reported to this committee on many occasions that the FAA is woefully under funded. Many air traffic control facilities are over twenty years old and are in desperate need of repair or replacement, but, aside from that, there is no money for the most basic needs, such as chairs for controllers to sit on. As this subcommittee begins tackling the issue of aviation trust funds off budget—or performance based operations and user fees—please keep in mind that NATCA definitely does not oppose more money for the FAA. However, NATCA does believe that increasing FAA’s budget should not come at the expense of strong congressional oversight and agency accountability at this time.

Several projects to modernize the center equipment are underway. Display System Replacement, which is a new system platform for future system upgrades, needs to be put on a priority list to be installed at all remaining centers. Eunomia—named for the goddess warden of the skies—is an essential phase of air traffic control modernization in that it would be a secondary system with datalink capabilities to replace the antiquated DARC backup system needs to be funded. Weather is the biggest cause of aircraft accidents and system delays, and with better equipment, such as the Weather and Radar Processor, and with more lead-time to avoid weather disturbances, controllers can reroute planes to avoid turbulent areas; thereby increasing safety and minimizing delays. Global Positioning System and the Wide Area Augmentation System –two systems that will work in conjunction with one anther to ensure precision and safety — have both been put on hold due to funding shortfalls, but are critical to other modernization efforts. In the rush to modernize enroute centers, we must retain current system safeguards, such as primary radar—which FAA plans to deactivate beginning June 2000. Primary radar is the least sophisticated type of surveillance, but it is the only tool currently available to detect aircraft or objects without an operating transponder. If a plane is equipped with a transponder, it can fail for many reasons, including electrical and mechanical failure; however, pilots can also choose not to turn them on. You can imagine that people involved in illegal activities would certainly like to keep themselves invisible—and that’s what will happen if primary radar is turned off.

Separate modernization projects are underway for terminal facilities—including, the Standard Terminal Automation Radar System and the Tower Datalink System. STARS will replace the aging scopes in 172 control towers across the country. Imagine, controllers in some of the nation’s busiest facilities will no longer need to use household fans to keep their scopes operational! Controllers, engineers and management have been working together to develop viable solutions to human factors issues related to STARS. The TDLS system will also help controllers more efficiently perform their jobs by issuing pre-departure clearances and digital automatic terminal information. This system is critical to avoid unnecessary delays and maintain the safety of passengers, but, unfortunately, instead of releasing the necessary funds, FAA is contemplating re-installing the old flight data input/output system.

There is much to be done in the modernization effort, and NATCA clearly wants to remain an active participant early on in the development and deployment of new systems. A change in FAA’s management culture may be necessary to ensure engineers, managers and controllers can work more cooperatively to design and test future equipment. STARS and DSR are two examples where additional costs could have been avoided if controller involvement had taken place in the early stages. NATCA is hopeful that, now, because of its involvement, the systems deployed will be much more suitable to the needs of those who actually control the nation’s air traffic. Above all, NATCA’s mission has always been, and will continue to be, to ensure safety in the national airspace system.

Testimonies and Speeches

Testimony of
Michael P. McNally, President
National Air Traffic Controllers Association
before the
U.S. House of Representatives
Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation Modernization
of the U.S. Air Traffic Control System
February 11, 1999

Good morning Chairman Duncan, Congressman Lipinski, and members of the subcommittee, first thank you for this opportunity to testify on FAA modernization and funding. I am Mike McNally, president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the exclusive representative of over 16,000 federal air traffic controllers and engineers within the Federal Aviation Administration.

Just a few weeks ago, the media began reporting that, throughout 1998, there was not one single domestic, commercial aviation fatality! This, when a record setting 628 million passengers traveled through our skies. In part, this feat was accomplished by diligent controllers handicapped by the unreliable systems and outages that plague today’s air traffic control infrastructure.

NATCA has long believed that adequate and sustained funding is essential to the modernization of the national air system (NAS) and we have reported to this committee on many occasions that the FAA is woefully under funded. Many air traffic control facilities are over twenty years old and are in desperate need of repair or replacement. We have asbestos in a majority of the centers in which the new Display System Replacement (DSR) equipment is being commissioned. There isn’t even enough money to replace or fix the chairs controllers use in their day to day work. These two examples show that the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) budget is not adequate to meet these basic needs.

As this subcommittee begins tackling the issue of aviation trust funds off budget, or performance based operations and user fees, please keep in mind that NATCA definitely does not oppose more money for the FAA; however, NATCA does believe that increasing FAA’s budget should not come at the expense of strong congressional oversight and agency accountability at this time.

Today, a majority in the aviation industry agrees that communications – in the way of computers, radar and radio equipment, as well as basic display equipment for the system – must be upgraded. To date, over 200 separate projects fall within the modernization program. Of these, 169 are air traffic control information systems and will cost about $21 billion.

All of us know of the money lost with the cancellation of Advanced Automation System in 1994—and this is the exact situation that NATCA is working to avoid. We are firm supporters of Administrator Jane Garvey’s "build a little, test a little, deploy a little" strategy, and NATCA will remain an advocate of this throughout the modernization effort.

I would like to briefly call your attention to a few projects because, they are critical to the modernization of the NAS. Retaining primary radar, properly integrating datalink, implementing the necessary safeguards for the global positioning system, automating oceanic control, installing DSR in air traffic control centers, and installing a useable STARS platform in terminals are each important to the success of the air traffic control system.

Primary Radar

In the push to modernize, we must ensure we do not lose the current system safeguards. Surveillance alternatives to radar, such as Global Positioning System (GPS) based on Automatic Dependant Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) will provide coverage in areas currently non-radar. These areas include oceanic airspace, remote areas, and mountainous terrain where a ground-based system cannot be maintained.

While use of these systems can augment the current primary radar and Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon (ATCRBS) systems, they require substantial investment and participation by the aircraft owner and operator. Although the transition from ATCRBS to ADS-B is not in the foreseeable future, the FAA plans to deactivate primary radar in the enroute environment beginning in June 2000. Primary radar is the least sophisticated type of surveillance, but it is the only tool currently available to detect aircraft or objects without an operating transponder.

This tool is used every day by air traffic controllers in the en route centers. While the vast majority of aircraft are transponder-equipped, and therefore detected by ATCRBS (secondary), many reasons justify primary radar capability for these aircraft. They are:

1. Transponder failure

• Without primary radar, the controller reverts to non-radar procedures. This is not only workload intensive to the controller who must make the transition, but it will also cause delay to all other aircraft utilizing the same airspace as the transponder failure.
• Separation standards will increase drastically.
• The requirements for pilot reporting and controller coordination are prohibitive.
• Non-radar procedures are predicated on the use of airways and VOR navigation aids. Many aircraft are on direct routing making non-radar separation difficult to establish.

• An aircraft with an electrical failure will not only lose the transponder, but the radio as well, making non-radar separation virtually impossible to ensure.
• An electrical failure may or may not be an emergency situation. Procedures require that a controller who loses both radar and radio contact with an aircraft will initiate "search and rescue." This will more often than not be a wasted effort, as an aircraft can fly safely without electrical power.
• In an emergency situation, the controller will not be able to determine the last position of the aircraft to assist in search and rescue activities.

• Primary radar is the only backup in the event of a failure of the ATCRBS
• Non-radar separation would be required for all aircraft in the event of such a failure.

• Aircraft is used in illegal activity. The current plans call for the continuation of primary radar coverage around U.S. borders, however; once an aircraft has penetrated the area, he could no longer be tracked. Additionally, aircraft engaged in interstate, rather than international illegal activity would not be detectable.
• Aircraft has violated a Federal Air Regulation. En route controllers routinely track aircraft that violated protected airspace or were involved in an incident, ensure the pilot can be contacted and corrective action can be taken.
• Human error.

• TCAS only detects aircraft with operating transponders, primary radar allows the controller to ensure that pilots are made aware of all aircraft in his vicinity.
• The vast majority of VFR aircraft in the en route environment are not in communication with air traffic control. While these aircraft are required to see and avoid, they are often in the path of IFR aircraft. The only way controllers are aware of these aircraft is if they have an operating transponder or through primary radar.

Datalink

Significant progress has been made in the last year to finally get a domestic air traffic control datalink system beyond the theoretical stage and to begin implementation. Now NATCA’s focus is to ensure datalink will successfully integrate into other programs within the national airspace system (NAS).

NATCA and the FAA have been working together to field the initial datalink capability to Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center in late 2001or early 2002. Initially, datalink will have only a limited capability, but two stages of upgrades are planned – the first of which is slated for nationwide deployment at all the domestic enroute Centers.

As I said, NATCA’s focus is in integrating the program successfully, and to make that happen, several other FAA programs, such as DSR and conflict probe to name a few, must be completed to ensure controllers’ workloads and the overall ATC mission will not be adversely impacted.

Display System Replacement

The Display System Replacement (DSR) is intended to modernize antiquated equipment in the 21 air route traffic control centers. DSR architecture serves as a platform for future ATC system upgrades. Its open architecture, or modular design is vital to the success of many future enhancements—such as conflict probe and datalink. Priority should be placed first on continued support for DSR implementation at all remaining centers, and secondly, we must focus on the evolution of a seamless integration for each new system.

Specifically, DSR will replace the current 19-inch monochrome circular Plan View Displays (PVDs) with 20 x 20-inch square display, replace the data and assistant consoles and the display channels with new technology, and provide redundant hardware and network paths for improved speed, reliability and capacity. DSR is currently in operation in only two centers—Seattle and Salt Lake City—and another 15 are slated to receive DSR this year.

The DSR platform needs Human Machine Interface (HMI) upgrades to ensure controllers will be able to use datalink and conflict probe in a truly integrated system. If this is not done, the controller will be confronted with several disjointed systems all vying for the same "real estate," i.e. keyboard buttons and display screen presentation area—not much of an upgrade in NATCA’s book.

Eunomia

At the present time, the enroute control center backup processing system—called DARC—does not have the capability to incorporate the datalink functionality rendering it virtually useless. The Eunomia project is slated to be the replacement for the backup DARC system. The backup system must include datalink functionality because, by the time this replacement is fielded, datalink will have transitioned from an "essential" to a "critical" NAS functionality.

Eunomia, named for the goddess warden of the skies, is an essential phase of air traffic control modernization. The estimated project cost is $450 million, however, it may be too early in the process to validate that estimate. Eunomia currently encompasses the requirements document for the en route domain to establish the minimum capabilities of the system in 2004 and provide sustainability until 2013. This program is in its earliest stage. A mission needs statement and initial requirement document have been written. We are currently in the investment analysis process. In its current state, Eunomia requirements address many of the needs for system modernization. As the investment analysis progresses, the issue of funding will determine which requirements will be met.

The current Eunomia requirements include:

1. Create a "secondary" system rather than a "backup."

• The current backup system has degraded functionality. It is not equivalent to the main system. It requires separate training for controllers and does not support any of the modernization tools.
• Eunomia currently requires a backup (secondary) system that has the same user interface and functionality as the main system.
• The current backup, Direct access radar channel (DARC) allows radar data processing in a degraded mode. When the system was developed, back-up system functionality was traded off for a faster start-up time. The Host system takes 20 minutes to boot up from a cold start, while DARC is less than 5 minutes, and is continuously available except in the case of a critical power failure.
• Advancements in computer technology and processor speed make the trade off unnecessary. The requirement for a continuously available backup and the less than 5 minutes from cold start time are still in place, but can be accomplished with full functionality.
• All of the requirements for the main system would be required for the secondary system.

• The current surveillance tracker can only process radar data and provide it to tactical control positions:
• It cannot make use of aircraft position and altitude information derived from other sources like mode S or ADS-B. This precludes the FAA from capitalizing on GPS based systems. Eunomia provides for accepting data from multiple types of surveillance sources.
• It does not support advanced strategic tools necessary to fully implement free flight programs.
• The radar tracker can only process data from 12 radar sites. Eunomia calls for the capability to accept data from 64 surveillance sources and be expandable to 128.
• ATCRBS (Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System) is limited to 4096 discrete beacon codes. These codes are assigned to aircraft to

4. Allow detection and alert of multiple types of conflicts.

• The current system only detects and displays alerts on aircraft-to-aircraft conflicts (conflict alert) and aircraft-to-terrain (minimum safe altitude warning)
• Eunomia would detect and display current types of alerts and aircraft-to-special use airspace (SUA).
• Provide audible alert as well as current visual alert.

5. Process Datalink messages.

• DARC cannot accommodate Datalink. This will become a problem when a main system failure requires the transition to backup. Datalink messages may be in process and the controller will have no way to determine if the messages have been acknowledged. This may substantially increase controller workload and frequency congestion at the most critical time.

6. Trajectory processing

• The current system has limited capacity to predict aircraft position even in the very near term. The velocity vector only provides useable information for aircraft with a stable track (i.e. not in a turn). Eunomia will allow four dimensional trajectory modeling to give controllers an accurate picture to determine future conflicts.
• The demands of the users through free flight programs are defining a need for enhanced strategic tools in addition to the more traditional tactical approach. This will require greater system resources to accommodate planning tools.

NEX-COM

The Next Generation Communications program —commonly referred to as NEX-COM—is slated to replace the analog voice ATC radios with digital voice communications around 2006. Also proposed in the NEX-COM plan is the upgrade of domestic ATC datalink communications from the initial technology into the technology used by NEX-COM.

To understand the importance of this transition for datalink, one must understand the very important difference between the terms "safety-critical communications" and "time-critical communications." Almost 100 percent of the communications exchanged between controllers and pilots within the ATC systems are safety-critical. In other words, the message sent by the controller to the pilot must arrive uncorrupted and in the exact form it is sent. The data contained is the message is critical to the safety of flight. However, not all safety-critical messages are time-sensitive, which must arrive in a very short period of time.

Some examples may clarify these distinctions. The datalink message "expect climb to level 350 at St. Louis" must arrive with the data uncorrupted. It is safety-critical but it not critical the message gets to the cockpit immediately, only that it arrives prior to the aircraft’s arrival at the specified location. The message "Climb immediately to Level 350" is not only safety-critical due to content but is also very much time critical in that the controller needs the message to arrive in the cockpit very quickly. Even if you remove the word "immediately" and send the datalink message "Climb to Level 350," the message may or may not be time critical depending on the situation and the reason the controller is sending the message.

To return to the relevance this explanation has to the NEX-COM program, the initial datalink capability planned to be fielded in Miami Center and then rolled out to the remaining domestic enroute centers will utilized the VHF Datalink - Mode 2 (VDL-2) technology. This system is designed to send safety-critical ATC messages but is prohibited from utilization for time-critical ATC messages. The VDL-2 is acceptable in our initial implementation because of the small numbers of aircraft to have datalink capability as well as the limited number of messages that will be available to the controllers. According to the plan, NEX-COM will be fielded over the VHF Datalink - Mode 3 (VDL-3) technology, which will be certified for the transmission of time-critical ATC messages. As datalink aircraft equipage increases, and as controllers use datalink in more and more complex situations, it will be absolutely essential that controllers have at either disposal an ATC datalink system that allows the use of time-critical messages.

Tower Datalink System

The Tower Datalink System (TDLS) platform is currently used at the busiest airports in the country. It allows controllers to provide Pre-Departure Clearances and Digital-Automatic Terminal Information Service (D-ATIS) to aircraft via datalink. This is a critical system necessary to avoid delays and maintain safety of airline passengers. TDLS automatically issues clearances, thereby freeing controllers to be more attentive to other areas of their difficult jobs.

Due solely to funding problems, a very real possibility exists that the TDLS platforms in the towers will fail, including the backup. (See attached FAA Alert Bulletin for ARS-1). Flight Data Input Output was replaced by TDLS, but now FAA is considering actually bringing the FDIO systems back in to the towers. In addition to the absurdity of spending funds that could be used to keep the TDLS operational, staffing levels in towers were reduced in conjunction with implementation of TDLS. Even if the FAA were successful in returning the FDIO to the towers, there is no longer sufficient staffing to man these positions.

The only feasible solution is to release the funds to keep the TDLS operational. The consequences of a failure to do this, both in delays to the flying public and in adverse impact to the controller workforce, make it imperative that all necessary congressional pressure be brought to bear to release this funding.

Global Positioning System / Wide Area Augmentation System

At the present time, FAA has put the local Global Positioning System (GPS) redesign initiatives on hold due to funding cutbacks. The full potential of the GPS flexible routing cannot be realized until, among other things, the routes are developed and implemented. To accomplish this, 45 enroute facilities and many major terminals were scheduled to receive the Sector Design Analysis Tool (SDAT) to analyze the effects of changing established traffic flows. SDAT is a FAA owned computer tool for assisting airspace and procedures specialists who develop and evaluate changes in airspace design. SDAT is an essential modeling tool for determining the feasibility of changing departure, arrival, and enroute flight paths. Only 12 of the proposed SDAT systems have been delivered to facilities. NATCA’s estimates additional funding is needed for hardware, maintenance and training.

The GPS system consists of 24 revolving satellites that provide all weather positioning information worldwide. However, basic GPS has limitations and cannot meet the high standards required for civil aviation applications. For example, military operations can cause errors in the signals, or the ionosphere can interfere with the signal as it bounces off electrically charged particles on the way down to earth.

The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) was designed to improve the accuracy, integrity and availability of the basic GPS. It is designed as a network in which reference stations intercept a signal and transmit it to a master station, which, then, processes corrections to the signal and uplinks it to geostationary satellites. They deliver it to an aircraft receiver. WAAS, when commissioned, is expected to provide category one precision approaches and is therefore necessary at each of the 21 enroute centers.

WAAS will aid air traffic controllers in identifying the areas affected by a GPS outage in real time. The WAAS monitor system development and implementation needs to be accelerated because phases II/III have been delayed indefinitely due to funding shortfalls.

Funding for a complete modeling, workload analysis, and risk/collision assessment is essential to determine if ATC can safely manage a large scale GPS outage caused by system failure or interference. The results of this study may directly impact the sole/primary means of navigation policy and the need for a backup system. The need for the simulation was recently supported by a Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory study, which also showed that GPS must be augmented to meet the FAA;s NAS requirements.

Oceans

The FAA’s plans to modernize the antiquated oceanic air traffic control system in the Pacific and the Atlantic have come full circle. The FAA, with NATCA’s support, has recommitted to replacing the ancient automation systems and manual surveillance concepts that have plagued the ocean airspace for decades. This initiative may take the form of an oceanic ATC support service contract in which the agency pays a third party vendor to provide automation, hardware and communications/surveillance as a billable service. NATCA is working with the agency on the service concept to ensure that safety remains the first priority and that controller needs are met.

For the air traffic controller and the ATC system as a whole, the benefits of oceanic modernization will be tremendous. The oceanic controller today monitors aircraft progress and separation using a pencil and paper –an operation that has changed little since the advent of air traffic control. It’s an operation that former Rep. Susan Molinari likened to "something from the Flintstones." Automating these manual processes will vastly improve controller efficiency allowing for heightened situational awareness and improved response to pilot requests. It is essential these manual processes be replaced in order to create the efficiencies necessary to take advantage of new satellite based communication, navigation and surveillance technologies. Only then will reductions in the vast separation standards, and increases in capacity be possible.

Oceanic system modernization is essential for in order to accommodate the planned GPS transition.

The Weather and Radar Processor

Weather is the biggest cause of delays to the air traffic control system. Equipment, such as the Weather and Radar Processor (WARP) system is designed to include weather data on the enroute controller’s scope so they can provide weather advisories potentially impacting flight operations. Improved weather data will allow controllers accurate information with more lead-time to reroute traffic, avoiding both turbulence and unnecessary delays. It must be remembered, however, WARP is intended to provide weather data only and should in no way be the catalyst for the de-activation of the long-range radar.

Standard Terminal Automation Radar System

The Standard Terminal Automation Radar System, commonly referred to as STARS, is a very important program. The $950 million automation system will replace aging scopes at 172 terminal air traffic control facilities.

STARS, however, faced the same problems as the DSR program, in that the computer-human interface was unsuitable for controlling air traffic and controllers were brought in at the back end of operational expectance testing. NATCA reported to this committee two years ago that human factors testing was essential, but it was not done until Congress ordered the FAA to conduct the tests.

Most engineers who build computerized controller tools and air traffic systems have a limited understanding of how air traffic controllers work in a terminal environment. Some engineers believe that the system that works in an enroute environment will automatically satisfy the needs of terminal controllers as well. This mistake has led manufacturers to offer systems that employ almost exclusively commercial off-the-shelf and non-development item equipment when the controller’s needs dictate a more customized approach. That is precisely why we are here today — months behind schedule.

FAA, controllers, and engineers are working together to resolve the 44 remaining (of the original 98) problems in order to make STARS operationally suitable for deployment—and progress has been made. Only eight projects, such as cursor brightness control, focus brightness text, weather colors and trackball lags, are without solution at this time. It is NATCA’s hope that after working together to ensure the success of DSR and STARS, a new way of management/union cooperation will be established for future modernization programs.

Merit System Protection Board

NATCA is thankful to the subcommittee for including language restoring Merit System Protection Board jurisdiction to FAA employees in the FY 99 FAA reauthorization bill. It is NATCA’s hope that the subcommittee will include last year’s MSPB language in your new reauthorization bill.

In closing, I would like to thank both Chairman Duncan and Ranking member Lipinski for allowing NATCA to testify on funding and modernization issues.